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Salvatore Attardo*
College of Humanities, Social Sciences, and Arts, Texas A&M University-Commerce, Commerce, TX, USA
It has been widely assumed that the full meaning of a linguistic expression can be
grasped only within a situation, the context of the utterance. There is even agreement that
certain factors within the situation are particularly significant, including gestures and facial
expressions of the participants, their social roles, the setting of the exchange, the objects
surrounding the participants, the linguistic, cultural and educational backgrounds of the
participants, their beliefs, including those concerning the situation, the social procedures
and conventions that regulate the situation. Finally, there is some agreement that context
is dynamic, reflexive (the speakers are mutually aware of their beliefs), not limited to
linguistics actions, and last but not least, a psychological construct. This definition of
context is not (very) controversial, but it leaves out two major problems, which will
be addressed in this paper: how is context arrived at? And, since a perfectly natural
interpretation of the above definition could be that the context of each utterance is
the entire universe, how is the relevant context delimited? Four related concepts will
provide the answer to both questions: abductive reasoning, driven by relevance and
cooperation, and bounded rationality and the principle of charity. Simply put, context
is derived abductively by the speakers assuming that for the speakers to behave the
way they behave and do so rationally, a given context must be available to them. The
context is bounded by the simple requirement that speakers not try to optimize their
interpretation/calculation, but rather satisfice, i.e., find the first acceptable solution and by
the need to follow the principle of charity, which forces intersubjective agreement. Thus,
abductive reasoning and bounded rationality will be shown to be sufficient to calculate the
relevant context of utterances (or other rationality-driven interactions) and to effectively
delimit the potentially infinite search space that must be explored to do so.
Keywords: context, linguistics, pragmatics, cooperative principle, principle of charity, relevance, abduction,
satisficing
I would like to begin discussing context by using a metaphor1. As is well known, metaphors have
heuristic powers, which will help us in this complex and fraught subject. The metaphor is that
studying context is akin to studying non-foveal vision. Peripheral (non-foveal) vision is quite
important in many situations (for example, in driving one becomes aware of the presence of a
car passing to the left or right through non-foveal vision, at first). This image helps us realize
that context exists only in opposition to a text. A context never exists by itself. It exists because
it is something other than the text. However, the metaphor is even more interesting, because it
highlights another feature of context: if we notice something in our non-foveal vision and we shift
1The metaphor is used also in Schegloff (1992: p. 223).
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of visual angle to focus on the thing (for example, by turning
one’s head to look at the car passing us on the right lane) then
the object is no longer part of the non-foveal vision, but it is now
in the foveal vision angle. To put it differently, one cannot study
peripheral vision by focusing on it, because the act of focusing on
it changes radically the nature of the thing to be observed.
As we will see in the present paper, most of the history of the
research on context has consisted, roughly speaking, of focusing
our gaze in the general direction of the object glanced at in
peripheral vision and then trying to describe or enumerate the
salient features of what is seen. I will argue that that approach
misses largely, but not completely, the point. The remainder of
the paper will be organized in two main parts: the first one
will provide a cursory and non-representative, but nonetheless
enlightening review of definitions of context, primarily within
linguistics, but with some extracurricular forays. The second part
will present the constructive side of the paper, presenting some of
the tools needed to derive and bound context. I should stress that
the present discussion should not be read as antagonistic to but
rather as complementary to traditional definitions of context.
A PARTIAL HISTORY OF CONTEXT
There are as many approaches to context as there exist disciplines
in the humanities and the social sciences. It would be unrealistic
to attempt to encompass them all. Therefore, I have settled
for presenting a largely linguistic overview of definitions of
context, to the detriment of other disciplines, such as psychology,
philosophy, and phenomenology.
Context Free Grammars
We will begin this review of definition of context, perhaps
perversely, with the zero-degree of the term, or more specifically
with Bloomfield rejection of the tractability of the very
idea of meaning, let alone context. Bloomfield, famously
rejected mentalistic psychology and espoused behaviorism. For
Bloomfield, since the meaning/context continuum is potentially
infinite it is eo ipso intractable:
We have defined the meaning of a linguistic form as the situation
in which the speaker utters it and the response which it calls
forth in the hearer.... In order to give a scientifically accurate
definition of meaning for every form of a language, we should
have to have a scientifically accurate knowledge of everything in
the speakers’ world. The actual extent of human knowledge is very
small compared to this.... The statement of meanings is therefore
the weak point in language-study, and will remain so until human
knowledge advances very far beyond its present state (Bloomfield,
1933, pp. 139–140; my italics, SA).
Bloomfield believed that sub-morphemic analysis of meaning
was impossible: “There is nothing in the structure of morphemes
like wolf, fox, and dog to tell us the relation between their
meanings; this is a problem for the zoölogist.” (1933: p.
162). However, as Langendoen (1998) points out, by the time
the American Structuralist school had reached its peak, sub-
morphemic analyses of semantics were being performed (e.g.,
Goodenough, 1956). The view that the semantic content of
a morpheme can be broken down in semantic features was
incorporated in Katz and Fodor’s (1963) semantics, which
became the de facto semantics of generative grammar (Chomsky,
1965). As the name itself of the type of grammar strongly suggest,
context-free grammars were not sensitive to, or interested in,
context. The idea behind context-free grammars is that rewriting
rules and transformations did their work regardless of the context
in which they occurred. NP rewrites as Art + N, regardless if the
NP is the first or the last of a sentence.
Generative semantics attacked the context-free nature of
generative grammar “semantics” (the scare quotes acknowledge
the reluctance that many generative grammarians would have
had in using the term) using a barrage of examples such as the
following:
(1) “John called Mary a republican and then she insulted him.”
(Lakoff, 1971: p. 333)
Example (1) above, in the emphatic prosody reading, works
only if we assume that Mary considers “Republican” an insult.
Or to put it differently, we need to know what Mary’s state of
mind is, in order to decide on the intonation of the sentence.
Clearly, someone’s state of mind cannot be part of themorphemic
meaning of a sentence
Worse, even such a concept as grammaticality, one of the core
ideas of generative linguistics, could be show to depend heavily
on context, with examples such as the following:
(2) “Kissinger conjectures poached.” (McCawley, 1976/1979)
Example (2) would be rejected by most speakers of English as
non-grammatical, unless they can imagine it as the answer to
the question: “How does President Nixon like his eggs in the
morning?”
As is well known, generative semantics self-destroyed (Harris,
1993) and was reborn as pragmatics. We take up that thread next.
Pragmatics
The linguistic tradition that Bloomfield was reacting against
in 1933 came from such German thinkers as Humboldt and
Wegener. Humboldt makes it very clear that, for him, meaning
does not come just from the forms of language but from
the “act of speaking” (see Nerlich and Clarke, 1996: p. 53).
Wegener claims that interpretation depends on the “situation”
Wegener (1885) and named his entire theory “situationstheorie.”
Wegener contemplates three types of “situations”: the objective
observations (views), the elements associated with the situation
by memory, and the (self-) awareness of the participants.
• die Situation der Anschauung [view] (1985: p. 21)
• die Situation der Erinnerung [memory] (1985: p. 22)
• die Situation des Bewusstseins [awareness] (1885: pp. 22–23).
Other factors in Wegener’s definition are the “ongoing or just
completed activity” and the Kultursituation [historical culture]
(Knobloch, 1991: p. XVI). Wegener also anticipates speech act
theory and Gricean pragmatics, witness the following quote:
Wegener was among the first to realize that speaking and
understanding are preconditioned by and embedded in practical
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action and also dependent on the cooperation among the speakers
(Knobloch, 1991: p. XVI).
The German tradition of seeing linguistic meaning as part
of a broader context, found a fertile ground in the work
of Malinowski. Malinowski is considered the founder of the
pragmatic concept of context: he is considered the “first to use
[the term] context in a systematic way” Nerlich and Clarke
(1996: p. 316). The following quote makes the central role of the
pragmatic context in Malinoski’s thought very clear:
language [...] has an essential pragmatic character [...] it is a mode
of behavior, an indispensable element of concerted human action
(Malinowski, 1923: p. 316)
whereas the following is a definition of context, from
Malinowski’s masterpiece, Coral Gardens and Their Magic:
it is very profitable in linguistics to widen the concept of context
so that it embraces not only spoken words but facial expression,
gesture, bodily activities, the whole group of people present
during an exchange of utterances and the part of the environment
on which these people are engaged (Malinowski, 1935 vol. II:
p. 22)
Malinowski’s influence, concerning the concept of context, on
the London School cannot be exaggerated. Raymond Firth, in
a 1956 piece on Malinowski, states that Malinowski “has been
one of the outstanding influences in shaping modern British
social anthropology” (Firth R., 1956: p. 1). Both J. R. Firth and
Halliday will be influenced by Malinowski’s definition, but also
Hymes’ (1972) definition of ethnography of speaking is strongly
reminiscent of Malinowski’s definition of context. Senft (2007)
goes so far as claiming that
the factors Hymes (1972: p. 65) summarizes in his famous
acronym SPEAKING—“settings, participants, ends, act
sequences, keys, instrumentalities, norms,” and “genres”—are not
only constitutive for the ‘ethnography of speaking’paradigm but
also for Malinowski’s “context of situation” (Senft, 2007: p. 148)
J. R. Firth acknowledges Wegener’s and Malinowski’s influence
very directly: “The key concept of the semantic theory he
[Malinowski] found most useful for his work on native languages
was the notion of context of situation” (Firth J. R., 1956: p. 101).
Firth’s own definition of “context of situation”: is as follows:
the linguistic text (...) finds a place and function in relation to
other categories such as the participants, relevant non-verbal
behavior, relevant objects and effect or result (Firth, 1957: p. 7)
Within the London school, which comprises Malinowski and
Firth, the author who has had the broadest impact on linguistics
is probably Halliday, who, somewhat ironically, emigrated to
Australia in the mid 1970es. Halliday’s definition of context is
formulated in terms of cultural meanings, but is also influenced
by Firth, for example in the insistence that speech is an act of
meaning:
Context is (...) a construct of cultural meanings, realized
functionally in the form of acts of meaning in the various
semiotic modes, of which language is one. The ongoing processes
of linguistic choice, whereby a speaker is selecting within the
resources of the linguistic system, are effectively cultural choices,
and acts of meaning are cultural acts (Halliday, 1971: p. 165).
Context, in Halliday’s functional model is articulated in terms of
field, tenor, and mode, but a discussion of his model would take
us too far afield. In a different context, namely a discussion of
intellegibility in spoken language, and 20 years earlier, Catford
also defines context in ther now familiar terms of the speakers,
the situation, and culture. His definition can be summed up as:
• Speaker and Hearer
• Relative positions and actions at the moment of utterance
• Various objects in the surroundings and their relations to
S and H
• H’s linguistic background and experiences as well as
educational and cultural background (Catford, 1950)
WithOchs (1979) definition of context, we are fully in the domain
of interactional sociolinguistics. Accordingly, the following
feature prominently in her definition of context:
• The immediate physical environment
• The verbal environment
• The social and psychological world in which the language user
operates at any given time
• The above is filtered by the world view of the speakers
• The behavioral environment, defined as “the [...] cultural
filtering that [...] turns physical behavior into conventional acts
and events” (1979: p. 2) e.g., “the procedures for entering into
and sustaining a state of mutual involvement” (1979: p. 3) such
as gaze matching (eye contact)
• The extra-situational context: the speakers’ beliefs and
understanding of the situation.
However, despite her socio-interactional orientation, Ochs’
definition reflects the zeitgeist of when it was presented, being
still very tied to the linguistic form. For example, Ochs discusses
extensively the grammaticalization of context.
Ochs’ definition proved very influential. Duranti and Goodwin
(1992: p. 6) explicitly take Ochs’ (1979) definition as their starting
point. The parameters they use are as follows:
• Setting: social and spatial framework
• Behavioral environment: “the way that participants use their
bodies and behavior as a resource for framing and organizing
their talk” (1992: p. 7)
• Language (co-text; contextualization cues; genres)
• Extrasituational context: background knowledge
Their discussion ranges very widely, to reach the conclusion that
context should not be seen as “a set of variables [the parameters
listed above] that statically surround strips of talk” (1992: p. 31)
but rather as having a “mutually reflexive relationship to each
other, with talk, and the interpretive work it generates, shaping
context as much as context shapes talk.” (Ibid.) The other major
contribution that Duranti and Goodwin provide is a focus on
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the relationship between talk and context, which they see as
paralleling that between figure and ground. The figure would here
be talk (the text) and the ground would be the context. This is a
crucial aspect of the definition of context, which Fetzer (2004: p.
3) calls the “core meaning” found, according to her, in “all the
usages” of the term “context.”
Despite approaching context from the perspective of the
agents, recognizing the figure/ground relationship between text
and context, and acknowledging that language is a part of
a “stream of activity” (1992: p. 3), Duranti and Goodwin’s
definition is still very language-centric.
Jakob Mey, long the editor of the Journal of Pragmatics,
presented in his pragmatics textbook a definition of context,
slightly clarified in the second edition of the book, which follows
below:
Context is a dynamic, not a static concept: it is to be understood
as the continually changing surroundings, in the widest sense, that
enable the participants in the communication process to interact,
and in which the linguistic expressions of their interaction
become intelligible (Mey, 2001: p. 39)
This definition has the greatmerit of stressing the dynamic nature
of context, which of courses entails the fact that it is enacted
and brought into being by the actors in the situation and not
somehow per-existing them. The other aspect that should be
stressed is that language performance becomes intelligible only
within the context, again not pre-existing it.
Finally, some aspects of Schegloff ’s (1992) discussion of
context fit in with the approach presented in this paper. Schegloff
recognizes the potential infinity of contexts (see below) and
upholds a dynamic view of context: the text helps determine
(“invokes”) the context: “the [text] (...) may be understood as
displaying which out of that potential infinity of contexts (...)
should be treated as relevant and consequential” (Schegloff, 1992:
p. 197)2.
Philosophy and Psychology
Philosophers have developed highly technical notions of context
that need not detain us. However, it is worth considering
Stalnaker’s “informal (...) intuitive” definition of context:
[T]he concrete situation in which a conversation takes place,
a situation with a more or less definite group of participants
with certain beliefs, including beliefs about what the others know
and believe, and certain interests and purposes, and interests
and purposes that are recognized to diverge. (...) intelligible
independently of any institutional linguistic practice (...) not
defined by the constitutive rules of some language game (...). It is
not just linguistic actions, but actions of any kind that take place
in a context (Stalnaker, 2014: p. 14)
2Schegloff (1992; 1997) is concerned primarily with the difference between the view
of context for the purpose of analysis (the analysts’ view) as opposed to the view
of context as integral to the unfolding of the speech event (the participants’ view).
Moreover his approach belongs to a tradition that does not fit easily within the
methodological underpinning of contemporary linguistics and in many ways is
antagonistic to (some of) them. It would be far too time consuming to review these
in any detail, not to mention that none of the discussion would be particularly
relevant to the present article.
Let us note the very significant “divorce” of the concept of context
from linguistic behavior (“not just linguistic actions”) and the
iterative nature of the common ground (“beliefs about what
the others know and believe”), familiar from Gricean semantics.
Stalnaker also notes that context is a dynamic concept which
evolves “in the course of a conversational exchange” (2014: p. 14).
There are numerous definitions of context in psychology, but
I will not be concerned with them. Instead, I will consider a
psychological definition of context advanced within Relevance
Theory:
context is a psychological construct, a subset of the hearer’s
assumptions about the world. It is these assumptions, of course,
rather than the actual state of the world, that affect the
interpretation of an utterance. A context in this sense is not
limited to information about the immediate physical environment
or the immediately preceding utterances: expectations about
the future, scientific hypotheses or religious beliefs, anecdotal
memories, general cultural assumptions, beliefs about the mental
state of the speaker, may all play a role in interpretation. (Sperber
and Wilson, 1986: pp. 15–16; my emphasis, SA)
What is relevant in Sperber and Wilson’s definition is not
the typically expansive listing of factors and components of
the context, but the clear and important realization that the
context of an utterance is not a physical reality but the
mental representations of the physical reality, or as they put
it that context is a psychological construct. Context does not
exist “out there” in the world. It exists “in the head” of the
speakers/interactants.
The risk with this definition is to attempt to make it fit
the standard “toolkit” of propositional logic, as for example the
following claim that an utterance conveys
a propositional complex that contains both explicit and implicit
information. (...) this information is constructed on the fly
as the interpreter processes every lexical item (...) While
(...) the propositional complex communicated by an utterance
is pragmatically narrowed and simultaneously pragmatically
broadened in order to incorporate only the set of optimally
relevant propositions (...) (Assimakopoulos, 2006: p. 1; emphasis
mine, SA)
Unless we assume that all information is propositional by
definition, which would render the word “propositional” hard
to define, there is no guarantee that all implicatures are
propositional. Consider the difference between:
(a) Dinner is ready.
and
(b) The chow is ready.
which is certainly not propositional, as presumably both
would be represented as
(c) ready(x)
whereas the connotations evoked, even outside of a rich context,
are clearly different. We will address the assumption that optimal
relevance needs to be sought below.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 4 March 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 305
Attardo Context as Relevance-Driven Abduction and Charitable Satisficing
Finally, we can conclude this selective review of the literature
with a book that defies classification, but that, given the
title (Context as other minds), I chose to list among the
psychological approaches. Givón (2005) is indeed such a wide-
ranging discussion that I will merely mention a few “recurrent
themes” (the title of a section of the first introductory chapter)
that are clearly related to the idea of context, to a greater or lesser
extent.
We can start with the idea of relevance, which is key to
the expansion of the search of the contex, starting from the
text. Abduction and analogical reasoning figure prominently on
Givón’s list. As we will see, relevance and abduction are central to
the discussion below. Givón also lists the concepts of similarity,
analogy, and metaphor which all are “dependent on the choice
of relevant context” (2005; p. 9) and other concepts such as
categorization and taxonomy which are dependent on “the
capacity to tell “major” traits” (2005: p. 9). While the connections
between all these concepts and the idea of context may be
not immediately obvious, it is clear that similarity, analogy and
metaphor “work” in relation to a frame (a context): an argument
is like a war, but only up to a point: if one of the participants starts
raising an army, or bombing some territory we are no longer
facing an argument. A whale and a submarine are similar, in
the for example they both function under water, but obviously
also very different. Along the same lines, dogs and coyotes are
similar, but of course also different, as captured by their Linnaen
taxonomy. Likewise, it would be absurd to argue that Fluffy, one’s
beloved poodle, is a completely different dog than the neighbor’s
mongrel, and should belong to a different genus.
Before leaving off the psychological and pragmatic theories,
we can address a point suggested to me by one of the referees,
who asks to compare the current approach to “social” theories
such as common ground (e.g., Clark, 1996) and the “theory of
mind” (ToM; e.g., Wimmer and Perner, 1983). Both common
ground and ToM “complicate” the notion of context by making
it relative to two or more participants, in the sense that the
parties must “share” some amount of knowledge. Obviously,
context is shared, to an extent, by the various parties that are
co-participants in the situation. To be aware of which parts
of context are shared and which parts are only available to an
individual (or the self) is a crucial need for the participants.
However, the present approach applies to the construction of
context regardless of whether it is shared or not: the expansive
and delimitative principles need to apply regardless of the shared
nature of it. Imagine, as Gedankenexperiment, a solitary climber
on the face of a mountain. In a difficult spot of the climb, she
says: “You can do it!” Assume, for the sake of the argument,
that we treat this is speech directed to herself, and not as an
imaginary conversation between the climber’s self and another
self. The principles that would govern a shared interpretation of
“do” (namely, climb this mountain) obviously must also govern
a solipsistic interpretation.
Literature Review Conclusions
There are a few recurring, central ideas that have emerged and
that are, in my mind, crucial to the understanding of context. I
will review them briefly and then move on to the proactive part
of the paper. The first idea is that context is not immanent, it does
not pre-exist the communicative exchange and/or the speakers’
consciousness. The second idea is that context is a mental
state that is constructed by the speakers and/or participants to
the situation “on the fly” as they go about their business in
the conversation/interaction. Specifically, context is constructed
along the lines of relevance and abductively, hence it is largely a
matter of implicatures. Context is bounded, i.e., it is not infinite.
Finally, we may note two competing forces at play: one is an
expansionist force that impels speakers or interactants to seek
out relevant parts of the environment to make sense of the
text/events. The other, less visible, but just as important, that
bounds the expansive search for relevant context, so that it is
limited effectively to what is necessary for the purposes of the
speakers/interactants.What follows examines the two tendencies.
DERIVING AND BOUNDING CONTEXT
I believe that one observation that emerges from the
consideration of the various definitions of context is that
there is an expansive tendency: the definitions get more and
more complicated in an effort to encompass all possible relevant
contextual factors. While that is understandable and even
probably necessary, it creates a problem, to which we turn next.
Fetzer (2004: p. 3) notes that “context can refer to the whole
universe.” We might add, just to ante up a little, that within the
multiverse cosmological theory context might refer to numerous,
in fact infinite, universes. As Fetzer concludes, “that extremely
general definition of context requires some delimitation” (2004:
p. 3) if for not other reason that the computability and
psychological reality of an infinite set of concepts is questionable.
The problem, of course, is that even if many have proposed
various theoretical constructs to define the domain of context,
some of which are reviewed by Fetzer, very few if any scholars
have explained how practically context is delimited by the
participants of the interaction. Ex post facto, it is always possible
to look at a conversation and find that socio-economical factors
were at play in delimiting the context to members of a given
socio-economical group (for example, the expression “he lived
alone with his servants3” presupposes that the servants do not
count as people, since “alone” requires the absence of others).
However, it is unlikely that the writer of the sentence above was
aware of and deliberately wanted to express this fact4. So, if the
delimitation of context is subconscious, happens in real time, and
is intersubjective (i.e., the participants to the conversation share
it or agree to it, implicitly), how can the speakers take care of it?
Moreover, it should not escape our attention that the derivation
of context takes place in real time (i.e., as the interaction takes
place or the conversation unfolds) since the speakers and the
context, as Duranti and Goodwin remind us, are in a dialectical
relationship.
3The sentence occurs on p. 65 of the Beadle’s monthly, volume 3, which appeared in
1867, in New York. The author is Kate Putnam Osgood. Our New House, A Story.
4Interestingly, this presents a serious problem for Schegloff ’s (1992: p. 215)
demand that “demonstrable relevance to the participants” be the warrant for claims
about context. Ideology can be very relevant to the establishment of context, but by
definition, it will be invisible to its followers.
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Deriving Context: Relevance, Cooperation,
Abduction
It is clear that relevance is the tool used to expand the context:
the search for relevant implicatures or other implicit parts of
meaning obviously drives the process whereby speakers look
for features in the situation that may be relevant to what was
said. For example, if speaker A says “hold this” while handing a
hammer to speaker B, relevance determines that the reference of
“this” is the hammer. A’s order/request could be paraphrased as
a request to hold the item identified by a deictic and the gesture
in the situation resolves the ambiguity, under the assumption of
relevance. If speaker A had wanted B to hold a book, why hand
them a hammer?
Along the same lines, it is obvious that an assumption of
cooperation is necessary to process the search for the relevant
context: unless he/she assumes that speaker Ameans what he/she
said, is being clear about it, etc. speaker B would have no reason
to assume that A wants him/her to hold the hammer and isn’t
going to drop the hammer or is trying to sell them the hammer,
or is a lunatic who likes holding hammers in their hand.
I assume that the reader is familiar with the Principle of
Cooperation, proposed by Paul Grice (see Grice, 1989). Likewise,
I assume that relevance is a known pragmatic principle or maxim
(see Sperber and Wilson, 1986). This is not the place to review
the discussion on the subjects, so I will not discuss them further.
Instead I will briefly deal with adbuction, which is definitely less
known in linguistic circles. A fuller discussion can be found in
Attardo (2003).
Abduction, “discovered” by Peirce (1960-1966), is a “third”
form of reasoning, besides induction and deduction. The general
form of abduction is as follows:
The surprising fact, C, is observed; But if A were true, C would be
a matter of course, Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true
(Peirce 5 p. 189).
Clearly abduction is not a matter of certainty: it is a probabilistic
“guess” to the best explanation. Moreover, the formulation of the
rule (A) which explains C is not itself part of the abductive process
for Peirce and so has to be justified externally. Some scholars (e.g.,
Hoffmann, 1999: pp. 281–284) argue that the generation of A
is itself abductive, which open the possibility of a regression ad
infinitum.
Other strategies are possible. Brogaard (1999: p. 141) stresses
the role of “unexpected or sudden regularities” (Peirce has
“surprising”) in triggering the abductive process. Regularities are
perceived against the background of observed facts (Kapitan,
1997: p. 482) that are “separated from other facts” (Kapitan,
1997), in fact, “[a]n essential step in the process of abduction is
the classification whereby a particular assembly of phenomena
comes to be regarded as a single explanandum.” (Kapitan, 1997)
So, according to Brogaard (1999), the process of abduction
works as follows: the subject observes an undifferentiated
stream of phenomena, at some point in time, some of these
phenomena exhibit some common feature, which leads the
subject to group the phenomena in a single explanandum,
furthermore, the presence of unexpected or surprising regularity
in the phenomena leads the subject to the formation of an
hypothesis which explains the phenomena, if true. The subject
then assumes prima facie the truth of the hypothesis. Presumably
the explanandum is more abstract than the mere collection
of phenomena, which strikes me as a significant part of the
explanatory power of the abductive hypothesis.
Other strategies have been used to ground the abductive
process, but I believe the present discussion is sufficient to show
how the search for a satisfactory context to explain the speakers’
utterances will be largely abductive in nature. The metaphor of
non-foveal vision I used at the beginning of the paper comes
in handy now as well. Much like non-foveal vision cannot rely
on foveal fixation, context searching cannot rely only on what
is inferrable or deductible from what is literally said in the
utterance or on what is said and its pragmatic enrichments.
Context searching and building needs to rely on adbuctive jumps.
If my wife walks into my office and asks “are you hungry?” to
assume that the time of the day (around noon) is relevant and
that therefore she is asking me to prepare lunch can only be
an abductive process. No logical inference ever could bridge the
gap between a question about my inner states and a request to
prepare a meal. Note that the time of the day, our habits (I feed
the humans, she feeds the animals), what we are doing (both of us
are working on papers), and numerous other factors contribute to
the successful abduction. These could never be accounted for in
inferential or deductive reasoning, as a matter of principle as the
list is open ended.
Bounding Context: Satisficing and Charity
The speakers are in need of a context-delimiting algorithm. I
propose the following as a first approximation.
1. Start from the immediate physical environment in which the
utterance is produced.
2. Use relevance-driven abductive implicatures to expand the
context as needed.
3. Stop when you reach the smallest construct consistent with the
principle of charity.
(a) To put it differently, stop when you can make sense of what
the speakers are saying and/or doing.
(b) To put it yet differently, satisfice to when the
speakers/agents make sense.
Bounding Through Satisficing
Simon (1983) proposed the idea of bounded rationality
(reasoning), i.e., a much more “realistic” view of rationality based
on limited knowledge and limited resources, which does not
arrive at optimal solutions. Simon introduced in the definition
of a (bounded) rational agent the following features:
1. the agent does not optimize (this is called “satisficing” [satisfy
+ suffice])
2. the agent does not guarantee consistency
The significance of these decisions is great: there is no guarantee
that the agent will find an “optimal” (best) solution, because
satisficing will lead to accepting a solution that achieves a given
goal, when a better option might have been available. Similarly,
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because not all possibilities are searched, inconsistent facts may
be present in the system. Inconsistency and suboptimality are
problems, but a conception of reasoning that is bounded is
preferable to conceptions of optimal rationality because, simply
put, real agents in the real world never have perfect information
and therefore bounded reasoning is more realistic. As a side note,
we can observe that bounded reasoning solves the problems
associated with the need to find optimal relevance, in some
formulations of relevance, since bounded searches for a solution
are guaranteed to find a solution, although it may not be the
best one.
Charity
We now turn to a discussion of the principle of charity, which
is of necessity longer and more complex than the discussion of
all the other tools we have examined so far, for the connected
reasons that, within linguistics, virtually no use has been made
of the principle of charity and, within philosophy, it has been
applied to different problems than those to which we have applied
it here.
There have been several proposals of charity principles. In
the specific sense that we are interested in, we may begin with
Wilson’s (1959: p. 532) “principle of charity” which states that
“We select as designatum [the referent of a proper noun] that
individual which will make the largest possible number of (...)
statements true.” Wilson’s discussion is technical and need not
detain us further, but the basic idea is clear: interpret speech so as
to maximize the truth of what the speaker says.
Quine (1960) generalizes the principle of charity, in the
context of his discussion of the feasibility of radical translation
(i.e., between non-related languages which have never been in
contact; Quine, 1960: p. 28). Quine essentially says that if a
speaker says something that seems clearly false, a bad translation
is more likely than imputing irrationality to the speaker.
Grandy introduces a “humanity principle” in the same
context. Grandy is critical of Quine’s definition and replaces it
with the assumption that “the purpose of translation is to enable
the translator to make the best possible predictions and to offer
the best possible explanations of the translate” (Grandy, 1973: p.
442). Since obtaining a complete account of the translatee’s beliefs
and desires is practically impossible, (Grandy argues that all or at
least many psychological states can be reduced to these) Grandy
concludes that
we use ourselves in order to arrive at the prediction: we consider
what we should do if we had the relevant beliefs and desires.
Whether our simulation of the other person is successful will
depend heavily on the similarity of his belief-and-desire network
to our own.(...) it is of fundamental importance to make the
interrelations between these attitudes as similar as possible to our
own. If a translation tells us that the other person’s beliefs and
desires are connected in a way that is too bizarre for us to make
sense of, then the translation is useless for our purposes. So we
have, as a pragmatic concern on translation, the condition that the
imputed pattern of relations among beliefs, desires and the world
be as similar to our own as possible. This principle I shall call the
principle of humanity (Grandy, 1973: p. 443).
The most significant discussion of a principle of charity is to be
found in Davidson’s philosophy. There is not a single, standard
discussion of Charity in Davidson’s work; rather, his observations
on the Principle of Charity are scattered throughout his work.We
can start with one of the last presentations of the principle:
the principle directs the interpreter to translate or interpret so as
to read some of his[/her] own standards of truth into the pattern
of sentences held true by the speaker. The point of the principle
is to make the speaker intelligible, since too great deviations
from consistency and correctness leave no common ground on
which to judge either conformity or difference (2001: p. 148; my
emphasis, SA)
The emphasized passage clearly shows that, in Davidson’s model,
without an assumption of a charitable reading, communication
would be impossible. Davidson insists repeatedly that his
conception of charity is both indebted to Quine (and to Wilson,
via Quine) and significantly different from his, since Quine
applies it only to logical operators, whereas Davidson insists
repeatedly that his Charity applies “across the board,” i.e., is a
general interpretive principle (1984: p. xvii; 1984: p. 153; 2001:
p. 148). As Jackman (2003) notes, Davidson’s charity principle
is broader than Wilson’s or Quine’s, since it is supposed to
determine not only referential semantic issues, but also which
propositions are (likely) to be true (or at least believed to be so,
by the speaker).
Charity, in Davidson’s work, is a central tenet because it
allows him to bridge between observable external behavior of
the participants and their beliefs/desires. The importance of this
step is of course due to his adherence to the behaviorist tenets
that only observable behavior could be relied on in scientific
work. Needless to say, behaviorism was discredited by modern
linguistics (Chomsky and most linguistics after him) and we now
freely speak of inner mental states, ideas, concepts, cognition,
and meanings. Without a charity principle, Davidson has no
way of guaranteeing that, absent social consensus, people mean
the same thing when they say something. Charity, by ascribing
the same true thoughts to all speakers, guarantees that there
is intersubjective agreeement and therefore translation between
languages5.
This is quite visible if we look at some of Davidson’s statements
on Charity. Charity, according to Davidson, is holistic, as can be
seen from the following quotations: “we make sense of particular
beliefs only as they cohere with other beliefs” (1980: p. 221); “the
content of a propositional attitude derives from its place in the
pattern”(Ibid.); “a belief is identified by its location in a pattern
of beliefs; it is this pattern that determines the subject matter of
the belief, what the belief is about” (1984: p. 169).
Furthermore, speakers are generally consistent:
crediting people with a large degree of consistency cannot be
counted mere charity: it is unavoidable if we are to be in a
position to accuse them meaningfully of error and some degree
of irrationality (Davidson, 1980: p. 221)
5One might ask, since I assume that mental states exist, why use charity at all? The
answer is that we need charity, but for different purposes than Davidson did.
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Davidson notes that since we sometimes accuse people of
being mistaken or of contradicting themselves, these charges
can exist only against a background of consistency. Davidson
allows for the presence of disagreement, error, and irrationality,
[“it cannot be assumed that speakers never have false beliefs”
(1984: p. 168) “of course a speaker can be wrong” (1984: p.
169)] but against the backdrop of general agreement, truth and
rationality: “disagreement and agreement alike are intelligible
only against a background of massive agreement” (1984: p. 137),
“the methodological presumption of rationality does not make
it impossible to attribute irrational thoughts and actions to an
agent, but it does impose a burden on such attribution” (1984: p.
159).
Speakers are also rational, for Davidson, “successful
interpretation [communication] necessarily invests the person
interpreted with basic rationality” (Davidson, 2001: p. 211).
Consistency, rationality, and coherence go hand in hand.
Davidson remarks that “we necessarily impose conditions of
coherence, rationality, and consistency” (Davidson, 1980: p.
231). In fact, the assumption of rationality, having beliefs, and
intentional communication in an agent is founded by charity:
If we cannot find a way to interpret the utterances and other
behavior of a creature as revealing a set of beliefs largely consistent
and true by our own standards, we have no reason to count
the creature as rational, as having beliefs, or as saying anything
(Davidson, 1984: p. 137).
Because it needs to rely on observable behavior, Charity is based
on public (social) assent:
A theory for interpreting the utterances of a single speaker, based
on nothing but his[/her] attitudes toward sentences, would, we
may be sure, have many equally eligible rivals, for differences in
interpretation could be offset by appropriate differences in beliefs
attributed. Given a community of speakers with apparently the
same linguistic repertoire, however, the theorist will strive for a
single theory of interpretation [...] What makes a social theory
of interpretation possible is that we can construct a plurality of
private belief structures: belief is built to take up the slack between
sentences held true by individuals and sentences true (or false)
by public standards. [...] Attributions of belief are as publicly
verifiable as interpretations, being based on the same evidence: if
we can understand what a person says, we can knowwhat he[/she]
believes (1984: p. 153; my emphasis, SA).
Davidson’s argument here echoes Wittgenstein’s against a private
language. A language with one speaker could not be said to
exist, because there would be no checking the meanings of the
signs. Evnine (1991: pp. 105–108) acutely notes that Davidson,
having acknowledged clearly the importance of the social aspect
of language, goes on to more or less completely reject the idea of
convention (Davidson, 1986), shifting his attention back from the
social aspect of language to the individual role.
Charity forces the interpreter to attribute to the interpretee
a set of true beliefs. Davidson seems to waver as to whether the
truth of the speaker’s beliefs is assumed relative to the interpreter’s
set of beliefs: he speaks of “assigning truth conditions to align
sentences that make native speakers right when plausibly
possible, according, of course, to our own view of what is right”
(1984: p. 137; my emphasis SA) and of interpreting the behavior
of another as “revealing a set of beliefs largely consistent and
true by our own standards” (Ibid.; my emphasis, SA). Elsewhere,
however, Davidson states that the speaker is objectively right:
“massive error about the world is simply unintelligible” (1984:
p. 201) and “successful communication proves the existence of
a shared, and largely true, view of the world” (Ibid.) Davidson’s
position that Charity guarantees the truth of most beliefs of
a community has not gone without challenges, e.g., McGinn
(1999: pp. 178–179; 180–196). McGinn rejects the truth claim,
but accepts the consistency and rationality claims in Davidson’s
account.
In my mind, the objections to the claim that the principle
of charity requires speakers to attribute to each others true
beliefs are misguided. Obviously Davidson never graded a set
of midterms in my introduction to linguistics class, otherwise
he would not have maintained that the possibility of “massive
error” (Davidson, 1984: p. 197) is ruled out. However, this is
beside the point. I understand Davidson as saying something
much deeper and interesting than the obviously erroneous claim
that people cannot be massively wrong about something. What
I think Davidson meant (or should have meant, see below) is
that even in order for my students to be massively wrong about
linguistics they have to be massively right about way more things
than linguistics in order to be counted as having the possibility
to be right or wrong about linguistics. So, for example, they
would have to have the true beliefs that linguistics exists, that
the exam exists, that I exist, that exams are graded, that one
wants to score well on an exam, etc. Here my interpretation of
Davidson is along the lines of Wittgenstein’s recognition of an
unquestionable background of knowledge which anchors the
very possibility of doubting something (e.g., Wittgenstein, 1969:
p. 94; Stroll, 1994: p. 180 makes the connection to Davidson’s
charity).
Davidson himself seems, however, to deviate from this sort of
reading, when he asks, rhetorically, “how clear are we that the
ancients (some ancients) believed that the earth was flat? This
earth? (...)” (1984: p. 168) and continues to argue that our earth is
a planet in the solar system, etc. and if one does not have these
beliefs, then (holistically) one cannot really be thinking about
the same earth. But this line of reasoning is unnecessary: why
not simply concede that some ancients were wrong about a few
thousand beliefs and nonetheless right about millions of others
(e.g., that the earth exists, that it is larger than one can walk in
several days, etc.)?
Within Davidson’s model, interpreters (speakers and hearers)
need to attribute to one another beliefs that “minimize
disagreement” (1984: p. xvii) or “maximize agreement” (1984:
p. 101): “a good theory of interpretation maximizes agreement.
Or, given that sentences are infinite in number (...) a better word
might be optimize.” (1984: p. 169).
Finally, Davidson notes that his account of interpretation via
charity goes against relativism (1984: p. 197); however, he also
notes that this does not amount to a universalist view (198).
Lukes (1982) considers the important implications of Davidson’s
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Charity and Grandy’s humanity against relativism (i.e., the
possibility that there exist radically different cultures, logics, or
worldview across which ideas are untranslatable). Rationality and
some beliefs need to exist across the board (i.e., to be part of the
definition of humanity), although obviously not all beliefs.
Finally, one may object to my treatment of charity principle
proposed by philosophers as linguistic principles, but in fact it
has been argued, convincingly to my mind, that this is precisely
what Davidson’s intention was (or at least that this is the outcome
of his views):
[Davidson’s] tacit equation of [the charity principle] with his own
views about the constitutive role of rationality in determining
what sentences we can be understood as holding true further blurs
the nature of the Principle and makes it seem more like a general
maxim guiding interpretation (Jackman, 2003; my emphasis, SA).
This concludes our discussion of the principle of charity, as
proposed by Davidson. It might be interesting, however, to reflect
briefly on specific linguistic aspects of charity. Let us recall that
Davidson points out that charity forces us to attribute “coherence,
rationality, and consistency” to the speakers we are engaging in
conversation with as well as substantive knowledge about the
world. The attribution of rationality entails the attribution of
some sort of set of Gricean principles/maxims, since the principle
of cooperation and/or the maxims are characteristics of rational
communication. This is familiar ground, which I will not repeat
in this context. The attribution of coherence is, in a sense, part
of the injunction of speaking to the point (relevance) but in a
different perspective it is responsible for the need to assume that
a speaker is, say, answering a question even if prima facie the
utterance does not seem to meet the requirements of coherence
and/or relevance. In other words, the option of assuming that the
speaker is incoherent is literally the dispreferred option. Finally,
the assumption of consistency is perhaps the most intriguing
in the linguistic aspects of charity. Essentially, it boils down to
the assumption that the speaker is using language units in the
same way, through the exchange, so that the meaning and/or
reference of the units does not change during the exchange. In
a more sophisticated sense, it also requires that we attribute to
a speaker the meanings that we know that speaker to intend. A
feature of (some) uncharitable readings is that they attribute to
the speaker meanings that the speaker would not have meant.
For example, the Wikipedia article on “Controversies about the
word niggardly”6 reports several instances of speakers attributing
racist intentions to those who used the word, apparently under
the misconception that it would be etymologically related to a
slur against African Americans7.
6Wikipedia. Controversies About the Word “Niggardly”. Accessed December 26,
2015.
7Interestingly, theWikipedia article also reports that some would be using the term
as a “code” word for the slur, essentially to provide deniability. In that case, the
reading that attributes racist intentions would not be uncharitable. Incidentally,
uncharitable readings are not inherently bad. They may serve political purposes.
For example, the Democrats made much of then-vice-President Dan Quayle’s
misspelling of the word “potato” in a 1992 school photo-op. Obviously and
charitably, Quayle knew the correct spelling, but accusing him of ignorance served
the Democrats’ agenda.
Charity and satisficing form the two bounding principles that
constrain the expansive tendencies of relevance and abduction,
seeking for features of the environment to make sense of the
exchange or of the text. If we had not already introduced
one metaphor, we could suggest thinking about the centrifugal
(expansive) and centripetal (bounding) forces in physics that
define the orbits of celestial bodies. In what follows we will
examine a few examples of context definition with emphasis on
the bounding, centripetal forces.
Examples of Context Derivation and Bounding
Let us begin by a non-controversial example: deictics are by
general agreement context-sensitive. Consider now the quantifier
“everything” in the following examples (short hand indication of
the “context” is given after the equal sign):
(a) Everything = “all that exists” (Wikipedia, consulted April 16,
2015)
(b) Make me one with everything= customer to hot-dog vendor
(c) I lost everything= investor after a stock market crash
(d) Everything = answer to the question: “Dr. Attardo, what will
be on the test?”
(e) I know everything= husband to unfaithful wife.
Example (a) is Fetzer’s un-delimited account in which the
quantifier refers literally to every entity in the universe. In
example (b) the transactional situation of purchasing provides
a justification for the direct request, while the hot-dog vendor
cart situation provides the antecedent for “one” (i.e., one hot-
dog) which in turns provides the boundary of the expansion of
everything to toppings by its affordances (see Attardo, 2005 for an
analysis of an “everything” bagel. along the same lines). Note that
in order for the reading to go off we must charitably not impute
to the customer the reading in (a). Example (c) is different, in
the sense that the situation in which the unlucky investor utters
it is very salient, as presumably many speakers are discussing the
market crash, newspapers and other media are commenting on
it, etc. Again, relevance provides us with a direction to look for
a referent for “everything”: the investor could have lost his/her
suitcase, his/her laptop, or any set of things that form a group,
but since we are talking about the stock market the most relevant
reading is that the investor lost in his investments (and note how
that shifts the meaning of “lost” from a literal sense of losing to
a metaphorical one, since obviously it is not the case that the
investor cannot find his/her stocks or municipal funds anymore,
but that the value thereof is greatly diminished). Once more
charity bids us to ignore the fact that prima facie (c) is likely to be
false since it is unlikely that all of the investments lost all of their
value. Generally, even bankrupt companies retain some assets
that are worth a small fraction of the valuation of the company.
Thus, (c) is to be taken as an exaggeration corresponding literally
to “the value of my investments has dropped significantly and to
the point that they are unlikely to fulfill the purposes for which I
had invested these sums.”
Example (d) shows very clearly both the importance of
charitable reading and of the affordances of the term “test.” Let
us start by the fact that tests generally consist of questions about
a subject. The situation bounds the test to an academic test in
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the humanities (as opposed to an endurance test in the marine
corps, for example). The students are trying to determine what
topics will be on the test. Abductively, we can infer that they are
interested in this information in order to study those subjects
(we will ignore if they will the neglect the other subjects, or if
they merely wish to fine-tune their preparation). My response
is cooperative (it provides them with the relevant information,
it is clear, to the point, succinct, and truthful), if adversarial
(I deny that there might be topics that should be prepared to
the exclusion of others). However, note how the students must
charitably attribute to me a bounded interpretation of “every
topic covered in class” or “every topic on the syllabus” or “every
topic in the book.” Had they failed to do so, they could have come
to the conclusion that every topic in their major might be on
the test (a relevant interpretation, but that would be irrational
on my part, as such test are not ordinarily given to students in
a regular class) or perhaps every topic in the discipline (again, a
relevant interpretation, since the course was called “Introduction
to linguistics” but again one that non-charitably would impute
irrational or abnormal behavior on my part).
Finally, in example (e) we must imagine a situation, common
from many narratives, in which a husband has discovered
evidence of the unfaithfulness of his wife (obviously, the example
also works with the genders reversed). Clearly the relevant,
bounded interpretation is that he husband knows everything
about the wife’s affair. Note how, if the wife’s response were,
“Oh really? What’s the square root of 1243?,” the assumption
of relevance and boundedness would disappear. But let us now
consider another response by the wife, who presumably has a
PhD in logic, and might object, “No you don’t. For example, you
do not know how many times I have made love to Arthur, nor do
you know what my pet name for him is!” The wife’s objection
is technically correct, since the topics she lists are within the
domain of the relevant information. However, her response
violates the maxim of charity, because it does not maximize
the instances of shared true propositions between her and her
husband. Indeed, by assuming that her husband means “I know
everything that is important about the fact that you are having
an affair” the number of shared true propositions would increase.
Note how, once again, the important abductive inferential work
done by charity to narrow down the domain of applicability of
the statement8.
All these example highlight the dynamic, changing
process whereby context is determined and bounded for
the communicative purposes of and by the dynamics of the
interaction of the speakers/participants. An observation should
also be made about the partially facetious nature of some of the
examples. Humor is a mode of communication that deliberately
switches between one set of expectations (a reading of a text,
for example) and another set of expectations that are different
enough to be incongruous in relation to the first set. The switch
can be achieved or merely partially explained or justified in a
number of ways, for example through an ambiguous term, but
8One may object that since the wife has deceived the husband, there is no need or
point to be charitable. This objection misses the point entirely. Charity is needed
to communicate, not to be nice to people.
also through a number of mechanisms, only some of which have
been identified and described in the literature. Because of this
switch in which the first interpretation of the text is rejected
in favor of a second one, the context of the text also changes
radically, although not entirely. Thus, in keeping with the
metaphor introduced at the beginning of the essay, humorous
switches between interpretations of texts may shed some indirect
light on the processes that constitute context.
To illustrate this claim, and to provide a further example of
the inferential processes in deriving context, we will examine
a joke. The text is taken from a monolog delivered by a
famous Italian comedian, who goes by the name of “Crozza,”
on October 25th, 2014 on La7, an Italian private television
channel. The entire clip of the performance is available online at
http://www.la7.it/crozza/video/leopolda-renzi-come-steve-jobs-
25-10-2014-139314.
The fragment we are interested in occurs within the times
1:13–1:45. Below ismy translation of the relevant parts of the text.
Renzi said: we will begin the proceedings in a location that will
remind us of a garage. A garage is a symbol of a place where
ideas become startups, create employment. He [Renzi] thinks he
is Steve Jobs. It’s clear. (...) Perhaps, the comparison with Steve
Jobs is appropriate. Since Renzi has been there, every year a new
thinner model of the Democratic Party is released.
The performance occurs in a relatively impoverished context,
with Crozza alone on an empty stage. During the first part of
the text, relevant quotations from the speech of Italian Prime
Minister Renzi are projected on the screen, behind Crozza.
The quotes are from Repubblica, a prestigious daily newspaper.
Obviously, the function of these quotes is to show that what
Crozza is saying is true and that the PM did in fact say those
things. Until the last sentence, Crozza is establishing a script
(or frame) for political governance. Within this script, the
creation of new and innovative employment opportunities figure
prominently as positive actions that politicians may undertake
to stimulate the economy and increase the well-being of the
citizens. In turn, the context of “political discourse” is broadly
activated. Then Crozza introduces the second script: Renzi thinks
he is Steve Jobs. Since Steve Jobs is a great entrepreneur who
created one of the most successful companies on earth, Renzi’s
comparison of himself with Jobs is inferred by the audience
to be a case of megalomania and hence ridiculous. Note the
shift from the political discourse context to the psychology of
Renzi. After another jab at Renzi, which I have not included for
simplicity, Crozza returns to the comparison between Renzi and
Steve Jobs, introduced as a joke in the first part. Now Crozza
says the comparison is actually accurate. In other words, Crozza
is now claiming that there is at least one trait in which Renzi
and Steve Jobs resemble each other. Since Jobs is high status
individual, the comparison will elevate Renzi’s own status. Crozza
then reveals that the similarity lies in the parallelism that both
Job’s company, Apple, and Renzi’s party, the Partito Democratico
(PD), release a thinner model each year. Of course, while in
technology thinner is better, in politics, thinner means less
electors, which is of course bad. Note again how the introduction
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of the scripts for technological gadgets and political parties
shifts the context, narrowing it down until it is pinpointed on
the PD’s loss of electoral share, since Renzi’s appointment as
Prime Minister. Note also, how charity not only bounds the
limits of the context to the shrinking of the Prime Minister’s
Democratic Party, but also forces the hearer to accept the
somewhat forced parallelism between Apple’s releasing thinner
telephones every year and the Democratic Party getting smaller
every year. To deny the validity of the parallelism would be a
serious violation of charity, as it would reduce Crozza’s point to
nonsense.
CONCLUSION
Hopefully, to use the metaphor of non-foveal vision we have
presented a set of principles and mechanisms that surround
context and that operating in conjunction, determine it, if not
completely, at least to a large extent. While this is not the
same thing as describing context, it is a meaningful step in the
direction of being able to determine what speakers do when they
think-within-context.
Recapitulating briefly, speakers subconsciouly generate a
mental construct of context using the concrete situation they
are in, in al its richness, the semantics of the utterances, all
inferences and abductive implicatures they can draw from those
led primarily by the assumption of relevance, but by cooperation
at large. The output of these, expansions is bounded by satisficing
and by the need to provide charitable interpretations of the
speakers’ (linguistic or non) behavior. Generally speaking this
mental construct is never above the threshold of consciousness,
but some features in it can be brought to the speaker’s attention
through humor or other marked situations.
I have based this account of the concept of context on
Davidsonian charity which I believe to be a significant addition
to the related concepts of cooperation and rationality which
are necessary to process implicatures and generally speaking the
pragmatics of texts. However, care should be takenwhen applying
a concept developed by philosophers within philosophy to amore
empirical field such as linguistics. First, it is quite possible that
my account of the principle of charity might not match exactly
what Davidson says about it and/or might not dovetail exactly
with other things Davidson said that are connected with it. As I
have said elsewhere about Grice and my reading of his work, as it
pertains to the principle of cooperation, sometimes it is necessary
to read what Grice or Davidson should have said. Reading a work
should be grounded in a reading as precise and close to the
intentions of the author’s as possible, but that should not stop
one from deviating from what the author says, if it is possible to
improve on it. Needless to say, one should be clear, as I hope I
have been, when one is doing which. Second, the use I have made
of the principle is probably not one of the uses that Davidson or
more generally philosophers would have intended. About this,
I am unapologetic. Using a door as a table may be a good or a
bad idea, but its success depends on how well it functions as a
table, not on whether its door-related teleology has been fulfilled.
Third, by using a concept from one theory of philosophy, one
does not enter in a binding contract requiring him/her to solve all
the problems related to that theory. If the door sticks, as a table
user, I am not morally, ethically, or otherwise bound to fix the
sticking problem (my advice: lightly plane the offending surface).
Fourth, using a concept from a theory does not require one to
adhere to the rest of the theory: if I am using a door as a table,
I have not committed myself to purchasing the house the door
comes from. Specifically and outside of metaphor, I do not buy
the behaviorist undercurrent in Davidsonian semantics.
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